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Abstract
The primary goal of voting advice applications (VAAs) is to calcu-
late the match between voters’ and parties’ (or candidates) policy
preferences. In order to do so, it is necessary for VAAs to estimate
the positions of political parties. In many respects this is a daunt-
ing task given that all the commonly used methods for doing so have
considerable drawbacks. Most VAAs use a combination of two meth-
ods, namely questionnaires sent to parties and expert coding based
on party manifestos. The paper will outline the existing approaches
in terms of validity and reliability and will propose some improve-
ments in the form of a formal approach to expert coding over multiple
rounds with anonymous feedback. The paper will present examples of
the advantages of this method using evidence from Choose4Greece, a
VAA launched for the May and June 2012 parliamentary elections in
Greece.
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1 Introduction
The intersection of politics and the internet has prompted the development
of many interesting research agendas over the past fifteen or so years. One
of the most promising ones is concerned with the advent of voting advice (or
voting aid) applications (VAAs). VAAs usually come in the form of inter-
net websites which allow prospective voters to get informed about the policy
preferences of candidates and political parties, and provide them with infor-
mation regarding the congruence between their own preferences and those of
candidates/parties. As such, VAAs allow political scientists to engage with
the public and influence electoral participation (Fivaz & Nadig 2010, Ladner
& Pianzola 2010), to generate data which can be used for testing questions
regarding voting behaviour, pledge fulfilment, policy congruence and the di-
mensionality of political space (Schwarz, Scha¨del & Ladner 2011, Katsanidou
& Lefkofridi 2010, Talonen & Sulkava 2011, Wheatley et al. 2012), but also
provide some unique opportunities for methodological explorations.
The core methodological challenge in VAAs is to calculate and present
the congruence or agreement between prospective voters and candidates or
parties. So far researchers and designers of VAAs have used different vi-
sualization techniques such as radar (aka spider) plots and two-dimensional
political maps, compared different methods of calculating congruence scores
(Louwerse & Rosema 2013, Mendez 2012), and investigated the effect of ask-
ing different sets of policy questions (Walgrave, Nuytemans & Pepermans
2009). Although the issues surrounding the positioning political actors have
attracted considerable attention in the electoral studies literature1 and gen-
erated several debates and controversies2 for some time now, it was only very
recently that researchers put the methods for generating party positions in
VAAs under methodological scrutiny.
Wagner & Ruusuvirta (2012) applied multidimensional scaling on the
data of 13 different VAAs and extracted two dimensions. The scores of the
first dimension were considered to represent party placements on a general
left-right dimension. The scores were also standardized to help with cross-
national comparisons and sometimes reversed in order to fit well-established
knowledge with regards to parties that are considered to be left-wing. Wag-
ner & Ruusuvirta (2012) correlated these scores with left-right party posi-
tion estimates obtained from expert surveys and the Comparative Manifestos
Project and found that, with a few exceptions, the VAA scores correlated
quite well with the established measures. Gemenis (2013a) reached similar
conclusions when he compared the EU Profiler left-right and EU integration
scale estimates to expert survey data. Nevertheless, the scales examined by
Gemenis (2013a) and Wagner & Ruusuvirta (2012) are not the ones which
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VAAs routinely use to match voters to parties. If VAAs were to calculate
ideological congruence on the basis of distances on such aggregate scales,
this would entail a bold theoretical assumption: that voters’ (and parties’)
position on all issues that consist a scale are interchangeable. Since this as-
sumption is problematic in electoral contexts,3 VAA designers have devised
various matching algorithms which are additive functions of the voter/party
agreement on each of the issues.4 Scaled VAA party positions may have
passed several validity tests (Gemenis 2013a, Wagner & Ruusuvirta 2012),
but if voter/party matching is based on agreement on individual issues, to
what extent parties’ positions on these issues as given by VAAs are valid
representations of where political parties actually stand? Unfortunately, it
is impossible to give a definite answer to this question in the absence of a
valid benchmark to which estimated party positions on individual issues can
be compared to. In is not surprising, therefore, that evaluations of party
positions on individual issues have focussed on reliability rather than valid-
ity (Gemenis 2013a). Nevertheless, reliability has been traditionally viewed
as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for validity in measurement. In
this sense, the minimum criterion for a good approach to estimate parties’
positions should be the degree to which it provides reliable estimates. In ad-
dition, the paper uses a second criterion to evaluate methods for estimation,
namely the degree to which they can be employed in the context of a VAA.
In other words, any proposed approach to estimation should not be overtly
costly, time-consuming or otherwise impractical.
The paper is therefore organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the advan-
tages and disadvantages of using the established methods for estimating par-
ties’ positions in the context of VAAs: elite and expert surveys, the content
analysis of party manifestos and the analysis of roll-call voting. Recognizing
that each of these approaches has several disadvantages which make their
application to VAAs problematic, Section 3 outlines an alternative approach
which has been devised with VAAs in mind. Although the latter has been
used by several VAAs including the EU Profiler, the paper identifies several
issues with this approach which make it less than ideal. Section 4 proposes
a new approach for estimating parties positions which builds on some of the
established methods. Using data from a VAA that has been deployed for the
May and June 2012 elections in Greece, the paper illustrates that the pro-
posed method satisfies both criteria set in this paper. While it is practical and
not overtly costly or time-consuming, it has the ability to produce reliable
and potentially highly valid estimates of parties’ positions. The concluding
section ends with some recommendations for designers of VAAs as well as
with some suggestions with regards to how this approach can be extended to
estimating parties’ policy positions beyond the context of VAAs.
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2 Established methods for estimating parties’
positions
As VAAs are designed primarily by political scientists, it makes sense to
start the discussion by looking at the methods which have been proposed
for estimating parties’ positions outside the VAA context. The literature
on such methods is extensive and not everything can be convered in detail
in this section. For instance, we consider methods based on media sources
(Helbling & Tresch 2011) or large scale voter surveys to be prohibitively costly
and time-consuming to be applied in the context of VAAs so it becomes
meaningless to examine the reliability and validity. The section therefore
focuses on three distinct approaches to which various methods can be grouped
to: elite surveys, expert surveys, the content analysis of party manifestos and
the analysis of roll-call voting. As noted in the introduction, the focus of the
discussion is on two issues, the degree to which their application is practical
in the context of VAAs and the degree to which they can provide reliable
(and potentially valid) estimates of party positions.
2.1 Questionnaires sent to political parties
The starting point is the most obvious approach. Why use complicated or
‘fancy’ approaches when you can do the obvious, that is, send a question-
naire and ask the parties to position themselves on the statements used by
VAAs. Stemwijzer, the pioneering VAA in the Netherlands, uses party po-
sition estimates exactly from this simple approach: questionnaires are sent
to parties and their responses are used to calculate the match between par-
ties and voters. Of course this is not a method pioneered by Stemwijzer of
VAAs in general, as questionnaires in the form of elite surveys have been
targetting party politicians for many decades now. There is nevertheless a
practical consideration that makes this approach rather impractical in coun-
tries other than the Netherlands. The problem is that political parties are
generally sceptical or even hostile to questionnaires which aim to measure
political attitudes. Parties are known to prohibit their MPs and activists
from answering such questionnaires (Baker et al. 1999, 172) or even threat-
ening with legal action (Trechsel & Mair 2011, 14–15) either because they
do not agree with the way the questions are formulated (Nezi, Sotiropoulos
& Toka 2010) or because they do not want to openly acknowledge that they
hold positions which are generally considered to be unpopular. When the
EU Profiler asked parties across the Europe to place themselves on its 30
statements, the response rate across countries was only 37.6%. Trechsel &
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Mair (2011, 13) call this rate ‘remarkable’, and in some sense it is given the
previous experience with elite surveys in the context of the European Parlia-
ment which have been plagued by non-response (Scully & Farrell 2003), but
still is impractical if one considers of using this approach as the sole way to
position political parties.
Apart from this practical issue, responses given by parties can be prob-
lematic in terms of their reliability and, consequently, validity. Even when
parties agree to provide answers to the given questions, the researchers have
no guarantees that parties will answer truthfully. In fact, there is consider-
able evidence that parties sometimes try to manipulate their placement in
VAAs in order to get an advantage in terms of voter matches. Wagner &
Ruusuvirta (2012, 406) report the case of a VAA in Finland where ‘some
candidates placed themselves in the middle of the response scale on all state-
ments’ which is generally advantageous in terms of the algorithms used for
matching. This manipulation became evident when the media criticised them
for doing so and the candidates in question were forced to change their re-
sponses. Ramonaite˙ (2010, 133–137) reports a similar case of a Lithuanian
VAA where a particular party responded to the questions in a specific way
which would give the party a popular with voters but otherwise ideologically
inconsistent placement. If researchers have no mechanism to check whether
the questionnaire has been answered truthfully and not strategically then we
are facing the possibility of unintentionally assisting electoral manipulation.
This is particularly true when VAA designers do not ask parties to ‘justify’
their responses by linking them to published sources or public statements (as
it was the case of StemWijzer in its first few years). Even when researchers
ask for such justifications, there is no guarrantee that the process will work
smoothly. citeasnounKrouwel2012 report that in the 2006 Stemwijzer con-
tained incorrect information regarding the positions for a particular party
as the latter gave the answers that were considered to be the most popular
among voters. When the Stemwijzer team asked the party to justify the
given answers, the party simply sent statements that attacked their main
opponent.
In general, there is compelling evidence that much of the data generated
from questionnaires sent to parties is unreliable. When the EU Profiler team
cross-checked the given responses (Trechsel & Mair 2011, 16–17), they found
out that in about 17% of party positions on individual questions there was
a discrepancy with what the parties have given and what the researchers
had independently found using other sources (including a 5% of substantial
discrepancy). For some VAA designers, this cross-checking is a necessary
step in party self-positioning. Nevertheless, as soon as researchers begin
engaging with the parties and challenging the given positions on the basis of
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party manifestos or other statements, then we are already using a different
approach in positioning parties which is distinct to simply ask parties for
answers. This approach is examined in Section 3 of this paper.
2.2 Content analysis of party manifestos
One of the most popular approaches in estimating parties’ policy positions
during elections is to content-analyze their election manifestos. The most
popular approaches are the hand-coding of units of texts known as ‘quasi-
sentences’ into a pre-defined coding scheme as practiced by the Compara-
tive Manifestos Project (CMP, recently renamed to MARPOR), the Euro-
manifestos Project, the Comparative Agendas Project and others, and word
counts by computer programmes scaled according to some algorithm or ref-
erence text (Laver, Benoit & Garry 2003, Slapin & Proksch 2008). There are
at least two problems with this approach which make it prohibitive in the
context of VAAs. First, it is well-known that many parties across Europe
and elsewhere do not follow the practice of publishing election manifestos, or
when they do these might not have the same structure and functions of the
election manifestos in countries such as the Netherlands or the UK. Whenever
election manifestos cannot be found, researchers often resort to wide variety
of proxy documents, such as pamphlets or party leader speeches. Since these
proxies often have been produced with different purposes or audiences in
mind, the comparisons to party manifestos might produce tenable or even
implausible results and give the wrong picture regarding where parties re-
ally stand (Gemenis 2012). Secondly, counting words or quasi-sentences may
easily reveal the degree to which parties consider the issues associated with
these words to be important, but to transform these frequencies into positions
additional assumptions are needed (Laver 2001a, Lowe 2008). In particular,
researchers need to define which words or coding categories are left or right,
progressive or conservative and so on in a scaling model. Some of the most
heated discussions have evolved around the adoption of the ‘right’ scaling
model5 but the debate remains unresolved. Comparisons of different scaling
methods, however, reveal these tend to produce radically different results re-
garding parties positions even when using exactly the same content analysis
data (Dinas & Gemenis 2010). If we, as researchers, have not yet agreed
with what is appropriate, then we cannot ‘sell’ the position estimates to the
citizens who are uninformed about our methodological assumptions and the
surrounding controversies.
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2.3 The analysis of roll-call voting
The analysis of roll-call voting as means of estimating the positions of leg-
islators has been very popular in the US context but also in the European
Parliament. In the latter case, the scores of the individual legislators have
also been aggregated and used as estimates of their respective parties’ posi-
tions (Hix, Noury & Ge´rard 2006). Although not widespread, roll-call voting
data has also been used for positioning actors in VAAs (S˘kop 2010). This ap-
proach has two drawbacks, however. One practical and one substantive. The
practical problem is that one cannot position parties which are contesting
the election for the first time or parties which are not represented in the leg-
islature through the analysis of roll-call voting. The substantive problem is
that for most of the European legislatures which are characterized by voting
patterns where all the opposition parties vote together against the govern-
ment irrespective of their policy positions. This means that the analysis of
roll-call voting in countries such as the UK or Ireland will not reveal parties’
policy positions but rather a dimension separating the government from the
opposition parties (Hansen 2009, Spirling & McLean 2007).
2.4 Expert surveys
Expert survey estimates have been the main alternative to content analy-
sis with respect to estimating parties’ policy positions. One of their main
advantages is that they are generally less costly and time-consuming than
content analysis, especially of the hand-coding type (Volkens 2007). More-
over, since they consist of mean responses among groups of political science
experts, they are less likely to produce results which are implausible, or
simply wrong (Marks, Hooghe, Steenbergen & Bakker 2007, Steenbergen &
Marks 2007). There was at least one instance which off-the-shelf estimates
have been used in a VAA (Wall, Sudulich, Costello & Leon 2009), but there
is also the potential of asking experts to estimate parties’ positions on the
specific statements used in VAAs. This potential use, however, might not
work very well in practice. If the typical VAA features 30 issue statements
and the typical European party system six important parties, then we will
be asking for experts to make 180 different estimates. How valid and reliable
would these estimates be? To quote an unnamed researcher who conducted
some of the largest expert surveys, let us say that experts have often ‘been
asked to provide judgements on topics that require information that exists
in the ambition of the surveyor, but not in the minds of experts’.
To put this claim to test, I examine the data at the individual expert level
of a recent expert survey conducted in Greece (Gemenis & Nezi 2012). Since
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it is difficult to examine the validity of estimates in the absence of a com-
monly accepted valid benchmark, I focus on the reliability of the estimates
on the assumption that low reliability increases the likelihood of low validity
(Krippendorff 2004, 214). As an indicator of reliability I use the agreement
among experts which can be used by van der Eijk’s (2001) coefficient of
agreement A. Van der Eijk’s A has desirable properties for measuring relia-
bility in the content of party position judgements since it includes a measure
of unimodality. The coefficient which ranges from -1 to 1, becomes smaller
not only when experts disagree with each other, but even less so when this
disagreement is clustered around multiple poles of the rating scale.
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Figure 1: Distribution of judgments in an expert survey.
The following figures show that although the experts generally agree on
the left-right placement of parties such as PASOK (A=.76), they have more
difficulties placing the same parties on more specific policies (e.g. environ-
mental protection for PASOK A=.49, European integration for Democratic
Left, A=.36, position on the bailout for New Democracy, A=.32). This
expert disagreement probably appears because different experts evaluate dif-
ferent actors within the party (the leader, the activists, the MPs), because
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they take different statements of these actors into account, and because they
probably also weight them differently in their final estimate (Budge 2000).
To be sure, one could challenge the presented findings on the basis of
several arguments. It could be that experts in Greece are not well-informed,
or someone could argue that the statements used in VAAs are specific enough
for experts to be able to locate parties consistently. The same problem (of
unreliability via disagreement) has been observed in the major cross-national
expert surveys of party positions. Researchers have generally found that
considerable disagreement emerges when experts are asked to estimate the
positions of smaller or newer parties and the positions on less-known or more
specific issues (Bakker et al. 2012). These results imply that if parties are
not to be trusted, experts might not be the most reliable source either.
3 A VAA-specific approach for estimating par-
ties’ positions: the Kieskompas
Since most of the approached reviewed here are problematic in one way or an-
other, Kieskompas, one of the most prominent VAA in the Netherlands, has
worked out an approach which combines elements from existing approaches
(Krouwel, Vitiello & Wall 2012). One the one hand, parties are asked to
place themselves on the VAA statements and justify these placements by
providing evidence from their manifestos or other publicly available docu-
ments. One the other hand, a group of experts is codes the party placements
using the party manifestos. The two estimates are then brought together
and compared. In the case of discrepancies, parties are asked to reconsider
their placement in light of the expert estimates. In the case when parties
can bring additional evidence to justify their position against the experts’
estimate, then this information is taken into account. The outcome of this
process is a party placement on either direction depending on which side
provides the most convincing evidence.
In many respects this approach is an improvement over the situation
which parties can self-place without any checks from the VAA designers, or
the situation where experts place parties on their basis of their judgements.
The combination of the two sources in the Kieskompas approach, however,
still requires the collaboration of political parties. Although this might be
taken as given in the Netherlands where VAAs have been around since the
late 1980s, it cannot be assumed in the case of other countries. Moreover,
the coding of party positions on the basis of manifestos are subject to similar
problems of disagreement. There are at least three sources of disagreement
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among expert coders: a) they might use different documents, b) different
evidence from the same document, or c) use the same evidence but interpret
them differently (e.g. what I consider as ‘completely agree’ for a colleague
might be merely ‘agree’). Using a ‘hierarchy of documents’ like the EU
Profiler did which adopted the Kieskompas approach does not address point
a) adequately as, in many contexts, recent statements might be more valid
presentations of where a party stands compared to a party manifesto which
was heavily debated in a party congress many months before. Yet even if
we accept that different documents should not be a problem, there are still
other potential source of unreliability.
To investigate the latter I set up a coding exercise where 80 European
Studies undergraduate students attending a course on conceptualization and
measurement agreed to participate after being offered partial course credit.
The students were assigned to German (n = 41) and Dutch (n = 39) lan-
guage groups based on their native or fluency language and where asked to
code a selection of Dutch or German parties on one of two sets of eight EU
Profiler statements. The parties and sets of statements were randomized
among students within each of the language groups. Moreover, the students
were given their 2009 EP election manifestos as the only source and were
asked to accompany each of their estimates with the exact source they used
copy/pasted from the manifesto. As expected, the agreement of their esti-
mates varied widely with van der Eijk’s A ranging from -.1 to 1. Averaging
A for each statement across parties resulted in figures between .55 and .78
indicating that, even when students use exactly the same documents, there
is enough disagreement to render some of their estimates as unreliable and
potentially invalid. Of course, some of the disagreement which results in A’s
should be attributed in mistakes in the interpretation of the scales. Even if
such mistakes are taken into account and corrected (by looking at the asso-
ciated statements that students used for giving each code) we can still find
substantial disagreements which are solely due to differences in the interpre-
tation or sources as noted above. Figure 2 presents some such findings in
terms of the distribution of the codes. Whereas students generally agree as to
where to place Bu¨dnis 90/Die Gru¨nen with respect to EU farmer subsidies,
they use different statements from the manifestos or interpret the same state-
ments differently when it comes to estimating their position in EU/Russia
relations, or even worse the positions of SPD or FDP in other issues.
How does the Kieskompas handle such disagreements? The EU Proler,
relies on ‘discussions among team members’ and consultations with experts
and the VAA leadership (Trechsel & Mair 2011). Making decisions by con-
sensus among the VAA team members, however, does not guarantee coding
reliability. Armstrong (2006, 5) makes a strong point when he argues against
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Figure 2: Distribution of estimates in a manifesto coding.
estimating quantities based on face-to-face meetings. Some people are louder
than others, some are more powerful or prestigious. Some poeple voice their
opinions and do not listen to others, yet others listen to what others say
and do not have time to think for themselves. As Krippendorff (2004, 217)
warned, ‘in groups like these, observers are known to negotiate and to yield
to each other in tit-for-tat exchanges, with prestigious group members dom-
inating the outcome [. . . ] and coding comes to reect the social structure of
the group’. Armstrong (2006, 6) therefore suggests that estimation can be
improved when the procedure guarrantees that the opinions can be stated
indepedently from one another and when they can be aggregated using a
‘pre-determined mechanical scheme’. Moreover, the current practice of group
discussions which prevents group members of working indepedently to each
other prevents the calculation of formal measures of disagreement which can
be used to gauge reliability. A solution to this problem is outlined in the
next section where I propose a formalization of the coding process among
experts.
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4 Learning from other disciplines: the Delphi
The problem of expert disagreement is certainly not unique to political sci-
ence, let alone VAAs. Psychologists, computer scientists, demographers and
professionals in the health sciences all encounter situations where groups of
experts are called to given answers to specific questions. Consider the follow-
ing example. A group of physicians have just examined a patient and need to
make an assessment of what the patient suffers from. Each of the physicians
has access to a set of medical tests which can be used to make the diagnosis
(x-rays, biopsies and so on). These physicians, however, likely to interpret
these tests in different ways and also likely to assign different weights to them
when making their diagnosis. The physicians could convene in the room and
try to agree on a diagnosis by taking to each other but, as Armstrong and
Krippendorff warned, the discussion will be most likely dominated by those
who have high prestige or a strong personality and not necessarily by those
who can make the most persuasive arguments.6 It has been therefore quite
popular for the past 50 or so years to try and solve the problem of expert
disagreemet by using a method called ‘Delphi’.
The Delphi method was first used in the 1950s to forecast technological
changes (Dalkey & Helmer 1963) and has been since applied in many dif-
ferent contexts. It is based on three principles: a) anonymity, b) statistical
aggregation, and c) feedback. Regular expert surveys use only the first two
principles whereas the coding of party positions on the basis of group dis-
cussions (the Kieskompas approach) uses only the last two principles. The
process of the Delphi method is quite simple. A ‘moderator’ selects a panel of
experts and asks them to give some estimates on the questions of interest and
justify each of their estimates (see Figure 3). This justification may come at
the form of an argument, or could point to the sources that the expert have
used for estimation. The experts work independently of each other and with-
out knowing the identities of the other experts involved. The moderator then
collects the responses and gives feedback to the experts for a second round of
estimation. The nature of the feedback in Delphi can vary. The moderator
can give measures of central tendency of the responses in the first round (me-
dian, mean), the minimum and maximum score along with the justifications,
a combination of both, or can even opt to feed back each and every estimate
along with its justification. In the second round, the experts evaluate the
other anonymous estimates and the associated justifications and provide a
second estimate which might be adjusted based on the feedback information.
An important characteristic of this feedback is that it is anonymous. As in
the first round, each expert is unaware of the identities of the other experts
and cannot tell where each estimate/justification comes from. In addition,
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to avoid the moderator being biased in favour or against any of the experts,
the process is (quasi-)double blind. The moderator knows the identities of
the experts but cannot tell which expert gave what estimate/justification.
The same process can be repeated over a number of rounds, which can be
predefined or otherwise decided by the moderator.
A considerable body of literature (for a comprehensive review see Rowe
& Wright 1999) has shown that the Delphi method gives more accurate es-
timates compared to mere statistical aggregation across experts (the case
of classic expert surveys) or unstructured group discussions (the case of
Kieskompas) especially when detailed feedback is given from one round to
another. The anonymity here plays a crucial role as it guarantees that con-
vergence on the subsequent rounds will be based on the quality of arguments
associated with the initial estimates and not of the personalities of the ex-
perts involved.
Panel of expert coders 
  
Round 1
Panel of expert coders 
  
Round n
Selecting questions, 
response scales, experts, 
the number of rounds and 
the structure of iteration
Feedback and monitoring
Moderator
Result
Figure 3: An outline of the Delphi method.
How does the Delphi method work in the VAA context? A first test was
conducted for estimating parties’ positions for Choose4Greece, a VAA set by
the Preference Matcher consortium of researchers.7 The moderator contacted
a group of twelve expert coders (PhD students or faculty members) and asked
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them to choose the parties which would be most comfortable working with.
Five expert coders were assigned to each party and the process took place in
an online platform which was designed specifically for the Delphi method.8
The facilitator supervised the process and participants were remunerated
with 70 euros per coded party. Expert coders were given a list links to
documents (party manifestos, policy sections in party websites, transcripts
of parliamentary debates) that they could use for justifying their estimates.
They were also told that they could use alternatives or, in case where they
could not find any other source, that they could provide a justification based
on their personal knowledge of the party. The coding took place over two
rounds and lasted about two working days for each coded party. During the
first round they experts had to give an estimated positions for each of the
given issues for the party (or parties) they were assigned to. In addition,
they had to justify their estimate using the aforementioned options. During
the second round the experts were presented with the median response as
well as all the individual (anonymous) estimates of the first round and their
associated justifications and were asked to estimate parties’ positions in light
of this feedback. The median response from the second round was taken as
the final expert estimate.
How high was the expert agreement on the first round and what was
the impact of the second round? Table 1 presents some results from the
coding process regarding the solar panels question in Choose4Greece which
is indicative of the high difficulty questions expert coders are faced with. The
question asked whether parties would permit the installation of solar panels
on agricultural land which could be used to produce agricultural products.
This was not a big issue in the campaign, but Choose4Greece associated
many of its questions with legislation that was proposed over the two years
prior to the election, this was one of the issues that came up. As most
parties did not include references to solar panels in their manifestos (or did
not publish manifestos at all), I consider this as a challenging issue which
can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the Delphi method.
As see from the table, for 10 out of the 14 parties coded, the expert
coders could not agree where to place parties as evident from the low (<
.7) coefficient of perceptual agreement (van der Eijk 2001). In all of the
parties but one the second round improved the degree of agreement. By
looking at the justifications to the estimates given by the experts during the
first round, it appears that converged during the second round was often
achieved by the following mechanism. When experts had little information
about the party position (evidenced by the justification they had given during
the first round), they changed their estimate in accordance to the estimates
that were associated with rich and compelling evidence. In cases of absence
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Table 1: Expert agreement over two Delphi rounds.
van der Eijk’s A
1st round 2nd round
Democratic Alliance 1 1
Recreate Greece! .9 1
SYRIZA .88 .7
ANTARSYA .88 1
LAOS .63 .8
Golden Dawn .63 .8
Drassi .6 .9
Social Agreement .58 .9
PASOK .4 .47
ND .13 .9
KKE .13 .9
Democratic Left .06 .75
Independent Greeks -.14 .43
Ecologist Greens -.6 .23
of compelling evidence, experts with less information often changed their
estimates towards the median response of the fist round. In the only case
where agreement was reduced, it did not fall below .7. In the cases of the
Independent Greeks and Ecologist Greens, some of the experts confused the
direction of the scales and placed parties on the other side of the scale implied
by their given justification. The moderator was easily able to detect these
instances and alerted the coders collectively (since the moderator could not
tell who did the mistake). In the case of the Ecologist Greens one coder
seems not to have missed this alert and repeated the mistake in the second
round resulting in a low perceptual agreement coefficient (.23). Nevertheless,
because the estimate came with a justification which clearly pointed that the
expert intended to place the party on the complete opposite side of the 5-
point scale, the moderator corrected the mistake at a later stage (A = .9).
Did this improvement in perceptual agreement led to any differences in
the estimates of party positions between the first and second round? The
answer to this question depends highly on the measure of central tendency
which is used to aggregate responses. When the mean response is used, there
are noticeable differences between the first and second round. Considering
that the 5-point response scales are ordinal, however, the median response is
the appropriate measure, which was also used by Choose4Greece. Since the
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median is robust to outliers, there were very few changes in party positions
despite the expert disagreement. In the question about solar panels, for
instance, there was a change for KKE (from ‘agree’ to ‘completely agree’), for
the Democratic Left (from ‘completely agree’ to ‘agree’) and the Independent
Greeks (from ‘neither agree, nor disagree’ to ‘completely agree’). Although
the differences are small, the noisier estimates of the first round could have
implications for the validity of inferences as, ceteris paribus there is a smaller
chance of estimates being valid when the estimates are unreliable.
5 Conclusions
The paper showed that the established methods for estimating parties’ posi-
tions (content analysis, expert surveys, the analysis of roll-call voting) have
prohibitive disantvantages when applied to the context of VAAs. Moreover,
relying on party self-placement is often impractical and/or risky. The ap-
proach followed by Kieskompas, and other VAAs of the same ‘family’ such
as EU Profiler, is an improvement over the existing approaches but relies
too much on the favourable Dutch context (e.g. parties which consistently
publish manifestos, parties which always respond to questionnaires) while it
does not provide formal measures of reliability.
This paper proposed an alternative approach to estimating parties’ po-
sitions by using the Delphi method. The results of applying the Delphi to
Choose4Greece gave encouraging results. The method was able to get expert
coders to reach agreement even in challenging situations where parties do
not publish manifestos or when they do not talk about the issues used by
VAAs in them. Importantly, the formalization of the Delphi method enabled
us to obtain precise measures of agreement which gives an indication of the
estimates’ reliability. Moreover, the process of two rounds enabled postcod-
ing reconciliation which improved the reliability of data (Krippendorff 2004,
219), while anonymity guaranteed that this reconciliation was based solely
on the quality of arguments and sources brought forward and not on the
personalities of those involved in the coding process.
There are also added advantages of having formal measures of expert
agreement over the two rounds. The Choose4Greece team used the agreement
measures of the second round to determine which questions would be used
in the public release of the VAA. The experts coded more questions than
the VAA intended to use so the team was able to drop those that had a
low coefficient agreement (A < .7) for more than two parties. Moreover,
the agreement measures from round one can be used as proxies for issue
importance in a VAA. Most VAAs ask users to indicate how important are
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the issues to them and consequently use matching algorithms which weight
for the degree of issue importance. None of the available VAAs, however, has
tried to introduce issue importance from the parties’ side, although this can
be easily accommodated in a matching algorithm. The reason is probably
due to the fact that no researcher has devised measures of issue importance
for parties which can be used in conjunction with specific questions such as
those which appear in VAAs. Expert agreement on a party position could be
a proxy of issue clarity or issue importance. If parties think that some issues
are more important than others, then their positions would be communicated
very clearly in the course of an election campaign, something which would
drive expert agreement during the coding process. Although some might find
such proxying controversial, I suggest that this is a suggestion which would
be useful if it is further debated.
Of course one can argue that the method proposed in this paper is more
costly and time-consuming than the Kieskompas approach. This is certainly
true but we need to consider that the Delphi is considerably cheaper and
time-efficient compared to other well-established methods such as the hand-
coding of party manifestos (Volkens 2007). Moreover, running a Delphi does
not require the responses of political parties, although such responses can
be solicited and used in addition to the Delphi estimation.9 These apparent
advantages make the estimation method proposed here a candidate for serious
consideration among the community of VAA researchers and beyond.
Notes
1See Budge (2006), Budge (2001), Budge (2000), Dinas & Gemenis (2010), Benoit
& Laver (2007b), Benoit, Mikhaylov & Laver (2009), Gemenis (2013b), Gemenis (2012),
Hooghe et al. (2010), Laver (2001b), Laver, Benoit & Garry (2003), Lowe et al. (2011),
Marks et al. (2007), Mikhaylov, Laver & Benoit (2012), Pennings (2011), Ray (2007),
Slapin & Proksch (2008), Steenbergen & Marks (2007), Volkens (2007).
2See Benoit & Laver (2007a), Benoit & Laver (2008), Benoit et al. (2012), Budge
& Pennings (2007a), Budge & Pennings (2007b), Budge & McDonald (2012), Martin &
Vanberg (2008), Lowe (2008).
3Consider the following example where two voters are matched to a party on the basis
of binary (left/right) responses to three issues which are combined to form a single 4-
point (0–3) scale. Both voters are right-leaning as they score ‘right’ on two out of three
issues and so does the party. By taking their positions on this left-right scale we would
assume perfect congruence, since all three actors have exactly the same score. This is not
true, however, as it is very clear that only voter A is perfectly congruent with the party.
The false impression of congruence stems from the assumption of interchangeable issue
positions. We cannot assume that attitudes on, say, taxes, pensions and privatization
are interchangeable even when we consider them to be indicators of a single (economic)
left-right scale.
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Voter A Voter B Party
Issue 1 Left (0) Right (1) Left (0)
Issue 2 Right (1) Left (0) Right (1)
Issue 3 Right (1) Right (1) Right (1)
Score 2 2 2
4Some of these are compared by Mendez (2012). Louwerse & Rosema (2013) are right
to comment that such algorithms effectively assume a n-dimensional space where n is the
number of issues.
5Benoit et al. (2012), Benoit & Laver (2008), Budge & McDonald (2012), Franzmann
& Kaiser (2006), Gabel & Huber (2000), Grimmer & Stewart (2013), Lowe et al. (2011),
citeasnounMartin2008, Slapin & Proksch (2008)
6Unless of course, the most prestigious and hard-headed physician also happens to be
the most resourcive and qualified in the group. This seem to be happening only in the
fictional Dr. House.
7See http://www.preferencematcher.org/
8See http://armstrong.wharton.upenn.edu/delphi2/
9The Choose4Greece solicitied responses from all parties by sending them the VAA
questionnaire. Only two parties responded and the team used the responses in fine-tuning
these parties’ positions on a couple of isues where there was higher than average expert
disagreement after the second Delphi round.
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